Saudi Arabia is the country’s strongest Muslim ally in the Middle East. Our fight against Islamic militancy is only successful to varying degrees because allies like Saudi Arabia stand with us. Saudi Arabia’s ability and willingness to do so, however, depends on its own political stability. That stability has been not only disturbed, it’s been upended these past few weeks—and even the most ardent Saudi analysts in America argue among themselves as to how this will end.
A dichotomy of sorts exists on the peninsula today. Currently, 70 percent of Saudi Arabia’s population is under 30, mostly liberal, and supportive of social change. Historically, however, the country and monarchy have been largely controlled by followers of Mohammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, the founder of Islamic Wahhabism. Such an environment gave birth to the likes of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden, however, was not the most hardline follower of Wahhabism. As a matter of fact, a group of more hardline militants attempted to assassinate Bin Laden at a Saudi mosque before 9/11, because they thought he wasn’t as hardline as he should be.
At first glance, a seemingly safe assumption would be that the under-30 population would result in rousing support for the liberal, anti-corruption actions of Prince Mohammad bin Salman, also known as MBS. Additionally, the easing of religious restrictions and the move toward dissolution of the feared religious police will make life easier for Saudi citizens.
There is a sense of energy among the populace similar to that which precedes a storm, even though there’s little expectancy of specifics; just major change. Drastic political and societal change in any culture is weighed by individuals on the immediate effect it has on them personally. Change of this nature generally engenders optimism as opposed to pessimism, especially when things have been oppressive or stagnant.
“This is partly about creating citizens from subjects,” is a recently overheard response, typical of the comments heard on the street.
Of consideration, however, is the fact that while the effects on overall culture are examined later, they are always eventually factored in and evaluated.
Encapsulated, MBS’s actions are seen as a war on corruption and a move toward democratization. The down-in-the-weeds specifics, however, may be a bit murky. The prince would say he is looking ahead to a time when Saudi Arabia cannot depend on oil and needs to diversify to survive.
MBS also seems to be willing to deepen the void and the conflict with Iran, eschewing any concept involving appeasement and referring to Iran’s leader Ayatollah Khamenei as the Middle East’s “new Hitler.”
Predominant Muslim nations have historically resisted change that mimics western-style democratic values, especially when the changes can be interpreted as conflicting with hardline Islamic beliefs and practices. Islamism’s defiant opposition to democratic values was amplified in part by writings of Egyptian Sayeed Qutb, hanged by the Egyptian government in 1966. Qutb was a leader in the Muslim Brotherhood and inspired the likes of present-day Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Qutb and other early Wahhabi-style Islamists were highly effective leaders and communicators. Such leaders were responsible, as an example, for the overnight transformation of relatively wealthy, powerful countries such as Iran in the mid-to-late 1970s. The swiftness with which nations like Iran morphed into Talibanic-style rule is still fresh in the minds of Islamists throughout the Middle East and in the accepted center for the most powerful Islamists, Saudi Arabia. Such hardline Islamist control began in Saudi Arabia soon after the Iranian Revolution and took on a life of its own. Very simply, MBS intends to end it. No other Saudi leader has taken such draconian measures to confront the hardline Wahhabi-style Islamists and the clerics.
MBS is returning Saudi Arabia to “moderate Islam,” and in doing so, is positioning himself as the leader of the world of Sunni Islam. If successful, it will no doubt go down in history as one of the great feats of any Saudi king. Sunni Islam in Saudi Arabia will be much less likely seen as a synonym for “radical Islam.” But what will happen if he fails?
Such a Saudi Arabia—more moderate, more democratic, and more of an ally to the West—a few years ago spawned up-and-coming jihadist bin Laden. Simultaneously, al- Zawahiri was just as fervently inspired by the same democratically charged changes in his country.
Of obvious necessity, MBS is making enemies. Doing so when instituting cultural change is unavoidable, but it is not necessarily a bad thing—unless those enemies are too many and too powerful. This problem can be exacerbated in the Middle East, as Muslim groups—even mortal enemies—have historically shown a willingness and even an eagerness to band together to fight a common foe.
To date, MBS’s situation is tenuous. He most likely has the support of the 70 percent of Saudis, but there’s no complete assurance of this. From an objective standpoint, one would assume the younger crowd would be behind him, but there are indications that even among this demographic he is not completely trusted. His record on human rights is less than stellar, and many of the under-30 crowd believe that his intentions are to keep most of the wealth he stripped from corrupt family members for his personal use, rather than fold it into the nation’s resources.
A close examination of the good, bad, and ugly pertaining to MBS’s actions is warranted. The good is fairly obvious. A moderate Saudi Arabia moving in a direction to free itself from the clutches of corruption among the powerful within the royal family can only be seen as positive. Traditional Islam abhors corruption, bribery, and influence peddling. As a matter of fact, before Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, such activities were rare. Among the numerous tribes throughout the country, any attempt at bribery or solicitation of a bribe—any type of corruption, in fact—was likely to bring a punishment of stoning or even death. All that changed when America and its allies began pumping Afghanistan full of cash. Most Saudis will applaud MBS’s crackdown on corruption as long as it is sincere. His enemies will spin this as a power grab designed to enrich him, and while there may be some truth to this, the public will be the final arbiter of his sincerity.
Adding to the “good” column is the fact that MBS is striving to free the nation of the strict Islamist, Sharia-adhering lifestyle required of its citizens. Very few Saudis are supportive of the religious police—especially if they have had an encounter with them. The end of immediate public beating or caning of women caught outside without the traditional hijab, for instance, will not likely be mourned. The likelihood of an increase in tourism and outside investment as a result of the reduction in religious sanctions will also be applauded by most.
In the “bad” column, MBS’s enemies are numerous and easily identified. Hardline Wahhabi clerics in Saudi Arabia have long wielded power in the country. Abdul Aziz ibn Saud—the first Saudi king who ruled from 1932 to 1953—some say, catered to the Wahhabi leaders because of their power. The royal family members MBS arrested and stripped of wealth, as well as their supporters—unbelievably powerful individuals—are not likely to simply accept their fate under MBS’s rule. It is doubtful they’ll resist a great deal or try anything rash until his father, King Salman bin Abdulaziz, is out of the picture, but it is also doubtful the royals and their supporters who have been stripped of their power and wealth will simply lick their wounds and go quietly into the night.
Many analysts believe MBS would prefer a full-scale confrontation to the long simmering cold war that has existed between the Saudi Arabia and Iran. Of note is the fact that the former Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh—a longtime ally of Iran and supporter of the Iranian backed Houthi rebels—was assassinated this month following his announcement to switch sides and align himself with MBS’s Saudi coalition.
MBS will likely reign for many decades in Saudi Arabia, but the year immediately following the death or retirement of his father will be a difficult one. It is also likely that during this initial year, when he stands alone as the nation’s king, any threat to his rule will result in America’s involvement. Saudi Arabia will be a different nation in the coming decade; maybe good, maybe not so good, but definitely different.
Dr. Godfrey Garner, a regular contributor to Homeland411, is a permanent faculty professor at Mississippi College, as well as adjunct in Homeland Security at Tulane University and Belhaven University. Following two tours in Vietnam and a lengthy break in military service, he rejoined and eventually retired from 20th Special Forces group in 2006. He completed two military and six civilian government-related tours in Afghanistan. He is the author of the novels Danny Kane and the Hunt for Mullah Omar, Clothed in White Raiment, and The Balance of Exodus, as well as an upcoming textbook on the fundamentals of intelligence analysis.
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